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This volume makes available 17 papers published by Gustav Bergmann 
(1906 – 1987) during the years 1946 – 1958. The edition of Bergmann’s 
works in three volumes by the publisher “Ontos-Verlag” (www.ontos-
verlag.de) is now complete. Volume II contains papers from 1960 – 1981, 
volume III contains Bergmann’s book Realism from 1967.  
Bergmann was born in Vienna (Austria) in 1906. When he received his 
doctorate in mathematics from the University of Vienna in 1928, he had 
already been invited to join the Vienna Circle, where he was especially 
influenced by Schlick, Waismann, and Carnap. He went to Berlin to work 
as an assistant to Albert Einstein and then returned to Vienna. In 1938 he 
left Austria as a Jewish refugee from the Nazi era. He soon obtained a po-
sition at the University of Iowa, where he was a member of both the phi-
losophy and the psychology department for more than forty years.  
In this volume we find Bergmann’s great programmatic essay of 1953 
“Logical Positivism, Language, and the Reconstruction of Metaphysics”, 
which lays out the core doctrines of logical positivism. Bergmann explains 
what branches of the movement there are and what is own position is. All 
logical positivists, says Bergmann, accept the linguistic turn which Witt-
genstein had initiated in the Tractatus. They pursue “linguistic philoso-
phy or philosophy of language” (146), they philosophize “by means of” 
language. Philosophy, employing linguistic analysis, has “the task of elu-
cidating common sense, and not of either proving or disproving it”. That 
is, it does not attempt to develop and defend true theories about the 
world, say about properties or about the human mind, or at least it does 
so only through investigating our language.  
According to Bergmann, the logical positivists fall into two groups, the 
ideal linguists and the analysts of ordinary usage. Among the ideal lin-
guists there are formalists, like Carnap, and reconstructionists, like Berg-
mann himself. “What the reconstructionists hope to reconstruct in the 
new style is the old metaphysics.” (147) Bergmann finds that philosophers 
use language in a peculiar way, saying things like that there are no physi-
cal objects, which taken in their ordinary sense are absurd. One reaction 
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to this would be to say that philosophers should stop saying such things. 
For Bergmann, however, this difference between ordinary discourse (in-
cluding the discourse of science) and philosophical discourse is part of his 
philosophical program. According to his philosophical method, the re-
constructionist linguistic turn, philosophical discourse is ordinary, or 
commonsensical, discourse about an ideal language (151). By contrast, the 
method of the ordinary language analyst is ordinary discourse about or-
dinary language, and the formalist’s method is just to develop the ideal 
language.  
“The ideal language is an interpreted syntactical schema” (155), that is 
“an idealization of our natural language” (84). It must fulfil two condi-
tions. First, it must be complete in that it accounts “for all areas of our 
experience” (155). For example, it must contain the way in which scien-
tific behaviourists speak about mental contents, but also the way in which 
one speaks about one’s own experience. Secondly, it must be such that, 
“by means of ordinary discourse about it” (155), “all philosophical prob-
lems” can be solved. Bergman believes that there is such an ideal lan-
guage. He believes that, for example, we can discover the categorial struc-
ture of the world through discourse about an ideal language because he 
believes “that the categorial features of the world reflect themselves in the 
structural properties of the ideal language” (84).  
As a reconstructionist Bergmann differs from the other logical positivists 
in that he does not hold that the old questions of philosophy, or their an-
swers, are meaningless. He does not reject metaphysics and ontology but 
reconstructs the old questions, such as whether properties are universals 
or whether ordinary things persist through time, and answers them with 
his new method. So he agrees with the other positivists in that classical 
philosophy is to be rejected, but he differs from them in that he thinks 
that the old questions can be reconstructed in the spirit of the linguistic 
turn. One view on Bergmann’s project is that through his “reconstruc-
tion” he clarifies the old questions and brings out what they should be 
getting at. Another view is that Bergmann proposes new philosophical 
questions which look in a certain way similar to the old ones, calling the 
 3 
new ones the “reconstruction” of the old ones, and that he fails to answer 
the old ones. For example, Bergmann reconstructs the old question 
whether there are universals, that is, whether things in themselves have 
ontological constituents of a certain type, as the question whether “the 
ideal language contains no undefined descriptive signs except proper 
names” (155). To illustrate, this is the sort of philosophical method which 
David Armstrong in his book Nominalism and Realism (1978) rejects 
when he writes: “[T]he identification of universals with meanings (con-
notations, intensions) […] has been a disaster for the theory of universals. 
A thoroughgoing separation of the theory of universals from the theory of 
the semantics of general terms is in fact required.” (xiv)  
This volume helps us to understand the difference between philosophy 
before and after the linguistic turn, and it helps to see the relation be-
tween the linguistic turn and the methods used in today’s philosophy. 
The editor, Erwin Tegtmeier, writes enthusiastically in the Introduction: 
“Bergmann’s positions are diametrically opposed to those of mainstream 
analytical philosophy, especially to materialism and nominalism. […] 
There will occur no renewal of ontology proper and on a par with the old 
ontology before the writings of Gustav Bergmann are studied more 
closely.” (13) From another point of view, however, it appears that Berg-
mann was not so different from the other logical positivists because he 
too rejected “classical philosophy” (178) and made the linguistic turn, al-
though he differs from them through his claim that we need to do ontol-
ogy. So if you are a metaphysician influenced by the linguistic turn, then 
you will benefit from reading Bergmann because you have much in 
common with Bergmann and he has contributed much to the kind of on-
tology you might be looking for. If, on the other hand, you are (like me) 
an anti-linguistic-turn philosopher, then you will benefit from reading 
Bergmann because it will help you to understand the method of main-
stream contemporary metaphysics and the influences of the linguistic 
turn.  
Here is a survey over the papers contained in this volume. The first two 
papers try to show how positivism can preserve the common sense core 
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of epistemological realism. Bergmann wants to “reconstruct realistic 
common sense within a positivistic frame of reference” (39). The first pa-
per, “Remarks on Realism” (1946), argues against some positivists that 
experience has to be founded on existence. For this purpose Bergmann 
defends a meaning criterion that assumes, against other positivists, that 
something is verifiable because it is meaningful, rather than vice versa. In 
the second paper, “Sense Data, Linguistic Conventions, and Existence” 
(1947), Bergmann criticizes A.J. Ayer’s suggestion that existence is to be 
defined in terms of direct apprehension and that thus “esse” is a synonym 
of “percipi”. For this he uses arguments G.E. Moore stated in his “Refuta-
tion of Idealism”.  
In the article “Russell on Particulars” (1947) Bergmann discusses sense 
data analyses. By a sense data analysis he means “an attempt to describe 
all percepts […] by means of a language whose simplest or basic sentences 
are of the kind exemplified by ‘this is green’ or ‘this is later than that’, 
where the descriptive universals ‘green’ and ‘later’ have their ordinary 
(phenomenal) meanings, and where the referents of ‘this’ and ‘that’ are 
objects of the sort many philosophers call simple momentary givennesses 
or sense data” (63). He criticises Russell’s sense data analysis, which 
avoids reference to particulars and refers only to universals. Russell ana-
lyzes ordinary things (or rather the percepts corresponding to them) in 
terms of bundles of universals.  
“On Non-perceptual Intuition” (1949) is a short, interesting argument 
against nonanalytical necessity statements. Is (1) “Everything that is green 
is extended” adequately transcribed as (2) “For all x, x is green → x is ex-
tended”? Bergmann considers whether (1) is to be transcribed, alterna-
tively, as (3) C(gr, ext), where “C” stands for “essentially connected” or 
“necessarily coinherent”. He argues, however, that transcribing (1) by (3) 
leads to the same difficulty as transcribing (1) by (2). The difficulty Berg-
mann means is that as (1) is certain the proponent of (3) has to maintain 
that it is certain that (3) → (1), in the way in which analytic statements are 
certain. But this is not certain because only analytic statements and 
statements containing only names of particulars and simple predications 
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(such as “gr(a)”) where we are “acquainted with what they express” (81) 
are certain. Bergmann indicates that there is a similar argument against 
causal connections. Remarkable about this paper is its assumption that 
(1) is certain (in the sense in which analytic statements are certain) and 
that (3) if it were a transcription of (1) would have to be certain too. This 
invites the objection that there is no need for the defender of (3) to as-
sume that (1) and (3) are certain.  
Next, we find in this volume a “Note on Ontology” (1950), comparing 
Bergmann’s conception of the ideal language with Quine’s.  
“Bodies, Minds, and Acts” (1952) and “Intentionality” (1955) discuss the 
mind-body problem. In order to solve it Bergmann investigates which 
“descriptive inventory of the ideal language” (107) is needed with regard 
to the mental.  
In “Two Types of Linguistic Philosophy” (1952) Bergmann compares the 
formalist linguistic philosophy, as represented by Carnap’s “Logischer 
Aufbau der Welt” and Goodman’s “Structure of Appearance”, and the 
antiformalist linguistic philosophy, as represented by British analysts like 
Ryle. He agrees with both parties “that all philosophical problems are ver-
bal” (112), but criticises the formalists for playing mathematical games 
that are philosophically irrelevant, and the antiformalists for being too 
much occupied with idiom.  
One of Bergmann’s main themes is sameness and diversity. In “The Iden-
tity of Indiscernibles and the Formalist Definition of ‘Identity’” (1953). 
The problem is in his view not whether the principle of the identity of 
indiscernibles is true but whether it is analytic. Here he offers only an 
analysis of the principle.  
“Particularity and the New Nominalism” (1954) criticises Quine’s and 
Goodman’s nominalism. The claim of “Some Remarks on the Ontology 
of Ockham” (1954) is that for Ockham a thing’s qualities are particulars, 
“tropes” as we call them nowadays. In “Professor Quine on Analyticity” 
(1951) Bergmann criticises Quine for overestimating the relevance of sci-
ence for philosophy. Russell’s reconstruction of Leibniz’s ontology is dis-
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cussed in “Russell’s Examination of Leibniz Examined” (1956). In “The 
Revolt Against Logical Atomism” (1957) Bergmann defends, against 
Urmson, Logical Atomism, i.e. the doctrine consisting of the picture the-
ory of language and the verification theory of meaning combined with the 
philosophical method of “reductive analysis by means of an ideal lan-
guage” (293). “Frege’s Hidden Nominalism” (1958) criticises Frege for 
not recognising the full ontological status of functions. In the last paper of 
this volume, “Sameness, Meaning, and Identity” (1959), Bergmann dis-
tinguishes two ordinary uses of “same”. First, the basic use, where “it 
makes no sense to search for a criterion by which to decide whether or 
not two existents are the same” (346). Secondly, “same” is applied to 
words and phrases and their meanings in the sense of “analytically 
equivalent”. Sameness in both senses is different from identity, which is 
defined through Leibniz’s formula “two things are identical if and only if 
whatever can be said of the one can be said salva veritate of the other” 
(346).  
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